Green radicals targeted
CSIS and the RCMP have identified Greenpeace and PETA as extremist groups that pose a threat to Canadians.
Which, in a tangential way, reminded me of recent correspondence I've had with John Duncan, our MP:
10 February, 2012
Topic: distressed by C-11
Dear Mr Duncan,
I am distressed by the implications of your government's Bill C-11, and trust you will follow the wishes of the vast majority of your constituents by not supporting it.
We are particularly upset by the proposals that allow private interests to control what we do online through digital locks and website-blocking. These, among other consequences, could severely threaten both our democratic rights, by stifling free expression, and our commercial interests, by curbing internet innovation.
Yours very sincerely,
To which he replied:
Thank you for your recent e-mail regarding The Copyright Modernization Act. I read your correspondence with interest and I appreciate you bringing your suggestions to my attention.
I share your concern that privacy concerns must be reflected in our legislation. We must balance the right to privacy with the need to access for criminal investigation processes and this will no doubt constitute significant debate in the House of Commons.
I have taken the liberty of forwarding a copy of your letter to my colleague, The Honourable Christian Paradis, Minister of Industry, for his review and response.
Sincerely,
...and on the 14th
Topic: even more distressed
Dear Mr Duncan,
I am astonished to find myself once more writing to you to urge you not to support a piece of proposed legislation, having done so only a couple of weeks ago on the issue of C-11.
This time it's C-30.
I am 67 years old and retired. Like many of my peers, I spend a lot of time on the internet. While my travels there are not in any way controversial, it offends me that people like me could, under the proposed legislation, be caught up in a police troll among internet providers, without me being aware of it and without anyone requiring a warrant.
It offends me even more that I will have to pay for this intrusion on my privacy by paying my internet provider for the costs associated with the program.
I do not know anyone, not my wife, nor my children, nor my friends, nor even my 96-year old father (also still active on his computer) who is not equally offended.
And, by the way, Mr Toews' comments likening our opposition to this bill to support for child molestation is an unspeakable affront which will not be forgotten unless retracted.
Yours very sincerely,
In response of which I received a generic justification of the legislation. I looked it over briefly, couldn't find an answer to even one of my objections, and deleted it.
I'll include it below, but suggest you read Ivor Tossell's Globe article, which succinctly explains why C-30 as presented to the legislature is an actual threat.
OTTAWA
Thank you for your recent inquiry regarding An Act to enact the Investigating and Preventing Criminal Electronic Communications Act (IPCECA) and to amend the Criminal Code and other Acts
Our Government is committed to keeping our streets and communities safe.
We are committed to ensuring that criminals, sexual predators, gangs and terrorists cannot exploit technology to hide their illegal activities.
While technology has advanced significantly over the past four decades, the legal frameworks and investigative tools available to the police and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) have not kept pace with this evolution.
This proposed legislation would provide law enforcement and CSIS with the modern investigative tools they need to help fight crime and national security threats.
The Bill would also strengthen and add new safeguards to protect the privacy of Canadians.
The proposed legislation will enhance Canada’s ability to work with its international partners to combat crime and terrorism.
I have attached answers to Frequently Asked Questions about this legislation to address your concerns.
Sincerely,
Hon. John Duncan, P.C., MP
Vancouver Island North
Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development
BILL C-30
An Act to enact the Investigating and Preventing Criminal Electronic Communications Act (IPCECA) and to amend the Criminal Code and other Acts
Q1. How will this Bill protect children from Internet predators?
• This legislation will provide law enforcement agencies with an investigative tool kit that is tailored to modern technology. This will give police the tools they need to investigate crimes committed against children in the online context more effectively.
• For example, by enabling police to have more timely and consistent access to basic subscriber information, the identity of suspects may be determined sooner so that investigations can progress more efficiently. The sooner an investigation can be undertaken, the sooner victimized children can be removed from harm’s way.
Q2. What is lawful interception?
• The lawful interception of communications is a vital tool used by law enforcement and national security agencies to investigate crimes, such as child pornography, drug trafficking, and murder, as well as threats to national security.
• Lawful interception involves listening to, recording or acquiring a communication or its meaning. To be lawful, law enforcement and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) may only effect an interception under the authority of the Criminal Code or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.
• The Criminal Code places a number of restrictions on the use of interceptions. Their use is restricted to only listed serious criminal offences, such as terrorist acts, murder, hijacking, or arms trafficking. This investigative technique is authorized once it has passed the Criminal Code’s highest judicial test, including the condition of investigative necessity.
• Subject to certain, very limited exceptions, police and CSIS may only intercept communications upon authorization from a judge.
Q3. How much is this Bill going to cost the Government of Canada?
• This Bill will cost the government approximately $34 million for the first 4 years, and approximately $19 million per year after that.
o To implement the new statute, when averaged out, the cost will be approximately $20 million annually for Public Safety, the RCMP and CSIS for the first 4 years, and $6.7 million per year after that. The funding was set aside in Budget 2006, and the majority of those funds will be used to support the telecommunications industry where authorities need to address urgent investigative gaps.
o The framework proposed under the new statute will be more cost-effective than the current one. Today, law enforcement and national security agencies work with telecommunications service providers – on a case-by-case basis – to put in place needed technical solutions. But these solutions quickly become obsolete as telecommunications service providers update their networks.
o The remaining funds are for the proposed legislative amendments and the ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime and its Additional Protocol on Xenophobia and Racism, and would be incurred by the departments of Justice, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Public Prosecution Service of Canada and the RCMP.
Q4. Why is the Government ignoring privacy advocates’ concerns with the new legislation?
• This legislation has been modified as a consequence of consultations held with various stakeholders, including privacy commissioners and privacy advocates.
• These consultations led to significant changes designed to strengthen the privacy safeguards contained in the proposed Act.
• The identifiers to be provided under the basic subscriber information provisions were limited to only those specified in legislation, as opposed to listing them in the regulations.
• The number of identifiers that authorities can receive upon request was reduced from 11 to 6, leaving only the customer name, address, email address, telephone number, IP address and name of the telecommunications service provider.
Q5. Can you provide evidence that police are unable to perform their duties under the current regime?
• The purpose of this legislation is to ensure that police will be able to perform their jobs more efficiently, while maintaining a required level of accountability and transparency. The Bill will bring existing lawful authorities up to date to ensure that law enforcement have an investigative tool kit that is tailored to modern technology.
• One such example is that, today, telecommunications service providers may provide authorities, without a warrant, with basic subscriber information under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. The problem is that there is no consistency across the country in how service providers respond to these requests: sometimes they respond in a timely manner, but often they respond only after considerable delays, if at all.
• Specifically:
o according to the RCMP’s National Child Exploitation Coordination Centre, in 2010, the average response time for a basic subscriber information request was 13 days, and only 72.5% of requests were fulfilled;
o one telecommunications service provider only responds to basic subscriber information requests on Fridays, regardless of when the requests are submitted; and
o another telecommunications service provider only accepts BSI requests via email, which can be problematic in emergencies.
Q6. Can police create a profile or track someone using IP addresses?
• The basic subscriber information provision does not give law enforcement the lawful authority to monitor websites for the purpose of creating profiles of individuals, or to track individuals. Under this legislation, police may request the name and address associated with an IP address using a basic subscriber information request.
• Requests for information from a telecommunications service provider about the website surfing activity or the real-time whereabouts of an individual would need to be made under production orders, warrants or wiretap authorizations contained in the Criminal Code.
Q7. Why can’t the police and law enforcement agencies get a warrant every time they need basic subscriber information?
• Basic subscriber information is often required at the beginning of an investigation and is considered to be “pre-warrant” information. The basic subscriber information that is provided is much less intrusive than what can be obtained with a warrant.
• Policing also includes several responsibilities that do not involve the investigation of crimes, and as such would not be applicable in a warrant context. These general policing duties often involve police seeking to identify contact information to, for example, notify next-of-kin in a traffic accident, return property, or assist lost or runaway individuals.
Q8. How will basic subscriber information requests be protected from abuse?
• The Bill would provide more checks and balances than exist currently relating to requests for this type of information by:
o limiting those who can request basic subscriber information to designated officials (with an exception for emergencies), to a maximum of five designated officials per organization or 5% of the organization’s workforce (whichever is greater);
o putting procedures in place for mandatory record keeping of all requests;
o stipulating that requests be made only to perform a duty or function of the designated official’s agency;
o mandating regular internal audits and requiring that reports on the findings of these audits be provided to the responsible Minister and to the responsible external review bodies (such as the Privacy Commissioner); and
o requiring that telecommunications service providers comply with the confidentiality and security measures included in the regulations.
• The Bill expressly reconfirms the role of review bodies to audit the basic subscriber information controls of an agency within their jurisdiction – such as the Privacy Commissioner for the RCMP and Competition Bureau, and the Security Intelligence Review Committee for CSIS – at any time.
Q9. Will this Bill put small telecommunications service providers out of business?
• The legislation contains a number of mechanisms to minimize the cost to service providers and ensure they are not unduly burdened. These include:
o requiring telecommunications service providers to build intercept capability into new equipment only. Companies are not required to add this capability to equipment in use before the Bill comes into force, as it is much more cost effective to include the intercept capability at the design stage;
o an 18-month transition period to allow telecommunications service providers time to adjust their network planning so that requirements are factored in during the design stage of new networks; and
o an additional 18-month transition period for small providers (less than 100,000 subscribers).
• Exemptions may be granted to telecommunications service providers for up to three years. Such exemptions can be used, where appropriate, in order to permit innovative technologies to be brought to the marketplace prior to being fully compliant with the requirements of the Act.
• Service providers will have flexibility in finding the most cost efficient solution for their particular networks based on their business practices.
• Telecommunications service providers will also be compensated when they assist with interceptions or provide basic subscriber information.
Q10. Is the Government lowering the threshold for existing warrants and orders?
• Existing authorization thresholds will not be lowered by this legislation. All thresholds for new and existing warrants and orders were developed to be consistent with current practice and with the reasonable expectation of privacy attached to the types of information involved.
• These proposals are about bringing existing lawful authorities up to date. This bill provides law enforcement agencies with a tool kit that is tailored to modern technology and modern investigative techniques. Privacy protections have been enhanced, and additional safeguards have been included to ensure the appropriate balance is struck between protecting privacy and ensuring the safety of Canadians.
• The amendments to the tracking warrant would increase the threshold for a tracking warrant to reasonable grounds to believe in situations involving the tracking of an individual’s movement using a thing usually worn or carried by that person. The current threshold for tracking warrants of reasonable grounds to suspect will remain for other types of tracking (such as tracking a vehicle). This amendment would take into account advancements in tracking technology as well as their heightened privacy impact.
Q11. Why is the warrant process for wiretapping being streamlined? How will this improve investigations?
• The streamlining process proposed in the Bill will improve efficiency and accountability by permitting investigators who are applying for court authorizations to intercept private communications to simultaneously apply to the same judge who issued that authorization, for other warrants or orders related to the same investigation, such as a transmission data recorder warrant.
• This will ensure that a single judge sees the entire investigative picture. In addition, it will allow for all the warrants and orders to be sealed simultaneously until a judge orders disclosure.
Q12. Why is it necessary to amend the provision in the Criminal Code that allows for the interception of private communications in exceptional circumstances (s. 184.4)?
• In 2008, in R. v. Tse (otherwise known as the Six Accused Persons case) the British Columbia Supreme Court struck down the s.184.4 wiretap provision allowing for the interception of private communications in exceptional circumstances on the grounds that there was a lack of oversight, a lack of notice to intercepted parties and a lack of reporting requirements to Parliament. The court gave Parliament until September 2011 (since extended) to make it compliant under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Subsequent decisions in Ontario and Quebec have also raised concerns about the constitutional safeguards related to that provision.
• The Government considers that s.184.4 is already compliant with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Nonetheless, to improve the amount of information available on the use of interceptions of private communications in exceptional circumstances and to enhance transparency and accountability, the Bill adds a new annual public reporting requirement, as well as an after-the-fact requirement to notify an individual that their private communications were intercepted.
• Collectively, these requirements would ensure that persons whose private communications are intercepted are notified and that information relating to the number of times police avail themselves of this authority is publicly available. These safeguards will ensure that individual rights and liberties are protected, while law enforcement continues to be able to rely on this important investigative tool.
